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FINTECH INDUSTRIAL BANKS AND BEYOND:
HOW BANKING INNOVATIONS AFFECT THE
FEDERAL SAFETY NET
Cinar Oney*
ABSTRACT
The FinTech industry has been utilizing technological innovations to
provide services traditionally offered by the banking and financial
industry. Until now, many FinTech firms engaging in these activities
had non-bank state licenses. The uncertainties surrounding their
current business models and the desire to expand the operations led
some of these firms to apply for industrial bank charters. An industrial
bank charter is one of the few ways for a commercial firm to control
a depository institution and allows FinTech firms to retain their
technological investments that are not directly related to banking.
However, access of these industrial banks to the federal insurance,
payment services, and the discount window raise some concerns. It is
claimed that the parent companies of these banks might gain an unfair
advantage over their competitors, misguide their creditors, or limit
their liabilities by benefitting from the federal subsidies given to the
banking industry. This Note analyzes these claims and proposes two
alternatives—credit card banks and state bank subsidiaries—for the
FinTech firms seeking to engage in the business of banking.
Particularly, engaging in non-bank activities through bank
subsidiaries could eliminate some of the persistent moral hazard
problems that the industrial bank model might entail. Although the
industrial bank activities would not pose a significant risk to the
federal safety net, these alternatives to the industrial banks could be
preferable for sustaining the development of the FinTech industry as
well as maintaining a safe and sound banking system.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent applications of two financial technology (FinTech) firms,
Square and SoFi,1 for industrial bank (also known as industrial loan
company or ILC) charters rekindled the decennial debate on these types
of institutions. The ILC charter is the only active state bank charter that
allows an enterprise to control a deposit-taking institution while also not
1. While SoFi has withdrawn its application due to change in management shortly
after the initial application with the FDIC, the company has announced that it has not
given up its plans for an ILC charter. Mike Breslin, SoFi Withdraws U.S. Banking
Application, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?
g=774d36ce-bb23-44e7-8a5b-a733d5d0074e [https://perma.cc/2CNT-EB27].
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being subject to the Bank Holding Company Act’s (BHCA)2 limitations
on the parent companies’ commercial activities. Opponents of ILCs have
long claimed that these institutions undermine the established policy of
separation of commerce and banking. According to these critiques,
industrial banks exacerbate systemic risk by extension of federal
subsidies to commercial firms without the consolidated supervision of the
Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve System (Board or Federal
Reserve) and create conflicts of interest.
FinTech companies utilize the developments in information
technologies to create efficiencies in underutilized segments of the
financial industry (for example, student loan refinancing) or they deploy
novel systems, such as distributed ledger or blockchain, to implement
elaborate solutions to minimize counterparty risk in transactions.3 Nearly
all FinTech firms are operating under state supervision using money
transmitter, money lender, or similar licenses. Until recently, the
resurgence and profitability of FinTech firms were attributed to the
regulatory arbitrage these firms employ by state licenses instead of
seeking to operate as a fully-regulated chartered bank. However, recent
developments indicate that some players in the FinTech industry,
including supervisory authorities, believe these licenses are not adequate
for the flourishing of the industry. Thus, some firms are seeking national4
or state bank charters.
This Note focuses on the controversy surrounding the extension of
the federal safety net to FinTech firms through ILC charters. The three
components of the federal safety net—federal deposit insurance, payment
systems, and discount window—are viewed as federal subsidies that are
granted to the depository institutions in order to maintain the safety and
soundness of their banking activities. Some commentators claim that if
ILC charters are granted to FinTech firms that participate in non-banking
2.
3.

Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012)).
Examining the Fintech Landscape: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 66 (2017) [hearinafter 115th Cong.
Hearing] (prepared statement of Frank Pasquale, Professor of Law, University of
Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law).
4. Lalita Clozel, Mobile-Only Fintech Makes Play for (Regular) Bank Charter, AM.
BANKER (July 25, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/mobileonly-fintech-makes-play-for-regular-bank-charter [https://perma.cc/649J-56LD] (“A
mobile-only financial institution called Varo Money . . . has filed formal applications . .
. to become a national bank.”).
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activities, then the commercial parent companies may benefit from the
subsidies designated solely for the banking system. Extending the safety
net to these institutions might give the commercial parent company access
to cheap loans, thereby giving an unfair advantage over their non-bankowning competitors. Further, it may induce risk-taking behavior on the
part of these firms, increase bank failures, and could result in a
catastrophic contagion that affects the entire financial system.
This Note argues that the the federal safety net does not actually
extend to the commercial ventures of industrial banks in most instances
due to the firewall provisions in Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal
Reserve Act (FRA).5 Furthermore, in the current economic context, some
aspects of the federal safety net might not function as a real subsidy.
Nevertheless, the industrial bank charter is not the only option for the
FinTech firms that seek to engage in the business of banking. This Note
proposes two alternatives, namely credit card banks and state bank
subsidiaries, for the firms that would like to continue their non-bank
activities. Particularly, engaging in these novel financial activities
through bank subsidiaries could eliminate some of the persistent moral
hazard problems that the commercial ownership of banks might entail. In
some circumstances, these alternatives could be preferable for sustaining
the development of the FinTech industry as well as maintaining a safe and
sound banking system.
Part I of this Note discusses the current regulatory framework for
FinTech operations, the ILC charter, developments in industrial bank
applications, and the reasoning behind FinTech applications for federal
insurance and bank charters. Part II of this Note considers how the
separation of banking and commerce relates to the federal safety net, and
the legal framework to contain the risk stemming from extending the
federal subsidies to commercial firms. Part III of this Note proposes two
alternatives—credit card banks and state bank financial subsidiaries—for
the FinTech firms that might want to engage in the business of banking
beyond the industrial bank model. Potential federal safety net leakage
issues pertaining to these alternatives are analyzed and differentiated from
the moral hazard problems surrounding industrial loan companies.

5.

12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (2012).
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I. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FINTECH AND
INDUSTRIAL BANKS
A. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT FINTECH REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FinTech does not have a strict definition.6 While originally used to
define firms that provided back-office services for banks,7 today the
definition of FinTech encompasses nearly all enterprises that implement
developments in information technologies to provide financial services.
The FinTech firms that applied for industrial bank charters, SoFi and
Square, belong to the two most significant FinTech subsectors:
marketplace lenders and payment systems providers. Marketplace lenders
rely on unique data collection, analytics, and algorithms to underwrite
consumer or small business loans.8 Payment systems providers enable
customers to make payments to vendors or other customers using mobile
applications.9 Marketplace lenders and payment systems may also utilize
distributed ledger systems10 or other novel technologies to conduct their
operations. There are many more emerging fields and new financial
products—such as robo-bankers, Insurtech, and RegTech—that are
expected to disrupt established industries in the near future.11 In fact,
industry and regulator usage of the terminology is broad enough to

6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-361, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY:
INFORMATION ON SUBSECTORS AND REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 1 (2017),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684187.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QCS-NCSY].
7. PAYPAL, FINTECH FROM THE FRONTLINES: THE OPPORTUNITY FOR TECHNOLOGY
TO IMPROVE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR ALL 10–11, https://publicpolicy.paypalcorp.com/sites/default/files/paypal-policy-paper_fintech-from-the-frontline.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YQD-ARAT].
8. 115th Cong. Hearing, supra note 3, at 50–54 (prepared statement of Eric W.
Turner, Financial Technology Research Analyst, S&P Global Market Intelligence).
9. Id. at 55–56.
10. See generally Elizabeth Sara Ross, Nobody Puts Blockchain in a Corner: The
Disruptive Role of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Services Industry and Current
Regulatory Issues, 25 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 353 (2017) (examining the impact of the
distributed ledger technology in the financial services industry).
11. See generally PWC, GLOBAL FINTECH REPORT (2017), https://www.pwc.com/jg/
en/publications/pwc-global-fintech-report-17.3.17-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7LW-A
RVH].
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include many established technology firms12 and partnerships with
traditional banks13 in this field.
While the technologies might be new, the underlying transactions are
not. Many FinTech firms operate under state licenses to transmit money
or to grant loans in the states where they conduct business.14 While a small
minority of these firms are seeking bank charters, currently no FinTech
companies have obtained state or national banking licenses that would
enable them to take deposits.15 If FinTech firms decide to own banks,
under the dual banking regime,16 they have a range of options from state
banks supervised by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
and the state regulators to national banks regulated by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Still, most of these firms target
specific segments of consumers or provide specific financial products and
may not have the desire to become fully-fledged depository institutions.
Furthermore, any bank charter requires compliance with regulations that
range from restrictions on products, services, number and location of
offices, and interest paid on deposits, as well as, requirements regarding
minimum capital and reporting of the financial condition and
nondiscriminatory activities.17 These costs associated with owning a bank
might have dissuaded many FinTech firms in the past.
Engaging in lending or money transmitting activities with state
licenses has its own disadvantages for the FinTech industry. Some
marketplace lenders have ongoing deals with banks to provide loans to
small businesses or consumers. These firms, rather than relying on
deposit-taking for capital accumulation, fund loans by securitizing or

12.
13.

See, e.g., PAYPAL, supra note 7, at 10–11.
115th Cong. Hearing, supra note 3, at 39–40 (prepared statement of Lawrance
L. Evans, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, Government
Accountability Office).
14. See id. at 19 (statement of Frank Pasquale, Professor of Law, University of
Maryland Frances King Carey School of Law).
15. As of this Note’s publication, the author could not find any FinTech companies
that have obtained state or national banking licenses.
16. See generally Emmette S. Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism,
31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 749 (1966) (analyzing the components of the federal and state
banking law).
17. Christian Johnson & George G. Kaufman, When a Bank Is Not a Bank: The Case
of Industrial Loan Companies, in FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 1, 4 (Robert
R. Bliss & George G. Kaufmann eds., 2008).
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selling loans to institutions or individuals.18 Square Capital, LLC,
Square’s subsidiary,19 through its deal with a Utah ILC, brokers loans to
small businesses.20 In this business model, “a bank makes loans and then
sells and assigns such loans to a non-bank entity that is engaged in
assisting with the origination and servicing of the loan.”21 While this
practice has been successful for a while, there is uncertainty regarding the
future of these arrangements. For example, the Second Circuit has found
that state usury laws are not preempted when a bank assigns a credit
agreement to non-bank third-parties for collection.22 This threatens the
marketplace lender model, because the marketplace lender may have to
charge an interest rate lower than what was previously agreed upon when
the loan was assigned to the lender by the originator bank. 23
Varying licensing practices across states and the requirement of
obtaining a separate license in each jurisdiction is also a hurdle these firms
must overcome.24 The lack of a unified regulatory framework might
increase the compliance costs and creates uncertainty.25 For example,
obtaining state lender licenses from all jurisdictions might take up to one
year and can easily cost half a million dollars.26 Some markets are located
in jurisdictions, such as New York, with extensive cybersecurity laws
affecting many firms that do business in that jurisdiction.27 Compliance

18. Brian Knight, Federalism and Fintech, in PROSPERITY UNLEASED 335, 336
(2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/22_ProsperityUnleashed_
Chapter22.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9PT-YM2W].
19. Square, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 3–7 (Oct. 14, 2015).
20. Square, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 8, 2017).
21. Id.
22. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 247 (2d Cir. 2015).
23. Square, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 8, 2017).
24. E.g., PayPal State Licenses, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/
mpp/licenses [https://perma.cc/8RCM-GXF2] (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) (listing
PayPal’s money transmitter licenses in each jurisdiction).
25. Brian R. Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 144 (2017).
26. MIKE WHALEN, BANK PARTNERSHIP OR GO IT ALONE? 2 (2016),
https://www.goodwinlaw.com/-/media/files/viewpoints/alerts/2016/082316-bank-partne
rship-article.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/F6ZC-D227].
27. For an overview of the developments in the New York cybersecurity laws, see
Jeff Kosseff, New York’s Financial Cybersecurity Regulation: Tough, Fair, and a
National Model, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 436 (2017).
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with these laws might increase the costs of services provided by the
FinTech firms nationwide.28
Recognizing the inherent limitations of state lender and money
transmitter licenses for FinTech industry, some regulators have attempted
to address some of these issues. In December 2016, the OCC proposed a
special purpose national bank charter for non-depository FinTech
companies (OCC FinTech Charter).29 The OCC Fintech Charter would
allow the special purpose banks to engage in all activities that are
permissible for national banks and these banks would have the
preemption rights that enable national banks to avoid state laws that might
limit their exercise of bank powers.30 However, if they accept deposits,
parent companies of the FinTech banks could still be subject to the BHCA
and its limitations on activities.31
Facing a preemption threat, state financial authorities challenged the
OCC’s authority to grant such special purpose charters.32 The uncertain
future of the charter, fueled by these developments, and the possibility of
parent companies being regulated as bank holding companies (BHC)
under the OCC FinTech Charter, persuaded FinTech companies seeking
a bank charter to look elsewhere.
B. THE INDUSTRIAL BANK EXEMPTION
The BHCA governs the activities of parent companies of banks and
the activities of nonbank subsidiaries of these parent companies.33 All
institutions that are FDIC-insured or that accept demand deposits and
28.
29.

Knight, supra note 25.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE
NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES (2016), https://www.occ.gov/
topics/responsible-innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bank-charters-forfintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/HES6-KNGR].
30. Id. at 4–6.
31. Id. at 6–7.
32. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Conference of State Bank
Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 17-cv-00763 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 26, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Vullo v. Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, No. 17-cv-03574 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2017), 2017 WL
2115444. However, the OCC asserted that it has the authority to grant special purpose
national bank charters to non-depository FinTech companies pursuant to 12 C.F.R. §
5.20(e) (2017). OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 29, at 3–4.
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012).
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make commercial loans are “banks” under the BHCA.34 Any company
exerting control over these “banks” are BHCs and can only be involved
in the business of banking and other closely-related activities.35
Subsidiaries of BHCs including the banks are also subject to the same
restriction.36 The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA)37
exempted some depository institutions from this definition of “bank,”
effectively making the parent companies of these institutions exempt
from a federal limitation on their activities. One of the exempted
institutions was the industrial bank, a relatively obscure state bank model
licensed and supervised by state regulators in California, Colorado,
Nevada, Hawaii, Indiana, Minnesota, and Utah.38 Industrial banks are
exempt under the BHCA if they do not accept demand deposits, have total
assets of less than $100 million or were acquired before August 10,
1987.39 To avoid the limitation on assets, institutions applying for an
industrial bank charter can offer negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW)
deposits, which are similar to demand deposits, except that customers
write drafts against the deposit in order to transfer funds to third-parties.40
Other than this limitation, ILCs would virtually have the same powers as
the other state banks.41 Thus, under the current banking framework, an
industrial bank charter is one of the few ways for a commercial firm to
control an institution with lending and deposit-taking powers, making it

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. § 1841(c)(1).
Id. § 1843(a)(2).
Id.
Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
38. Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007, H.R. Rep. No. 110-155, at 9
(2007).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H)(i).
40. The main difference between NOW accounts and demand deposits is that NOW
accounts give the ILC the right, but not obligation, to require a written notice from the
depositor at least seven days before withdrawal. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-621, INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONS: RECENT ASSET GROWTH AND
COMMERCIAL INTEREST HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENCES IN REGULATORY AUTHORITY 23
(2005).
41. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
AND THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL PURSUANT TO SECTION 620 OF THE
DODD-FRANK ACT 33 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
files/bcreg20160908a1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UDT-MKRV].
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an attractive venue for FinTech firms seeking an alternative to national or
state banking regimes.
Subsequent to the 1987 exemption for industrial banks and until
2006, total aggregate assets of industrial banks increased from $4.2 billion
to more than $177 billion.42 The exceptional growth of industrial banks
between 1987 and 2006 and the increase in applications to incorporate
ILCs under Utah law drew attention to this state bank model.43 In
particular, an ILC application from Walmart raised opposition from many
individuals and industry representatives44—with criticisms centered on
the conflict of interest issues. For example, opponents argued that an ILC
operated by Walmart would either decline to extend credit to competitors
of its stores45 or favorably underwrite loans to its stores’ customers.46 The
FDIC received approximately 13,800 letters protesting Walmart’s attempt
to operate an industrial bank.47 As a response to the widespread
opposition, the FDIC declared a six-month moratorium on all applications
that involve a newly established industrial bank or an industrial bank
going through a change in control in July 2006.48 The FDIC extended the
moratorium for non-financial parent companies until January 31, 2008.49
In response to the adverse public reaction, Walmart withdrew its
application with the FDIC in March 2007.50 During the 2008 Financial
42. Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5218
(proposed Feb. 5, 2007).
43. See generally Lalita Clozel, Square’s ILC Bid May Open Floodgates for
Fintechs, AM. BANKER (Sept. 11, 2017, 2:14 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/
news/squares-industrial-loan-company-application-may-open-floodgates-for-otherfintech-firms [https://perma.cc/FK78-X6SF].
44. See Michael Barbaro, Bankers Oppose Wal-Mart as Rival, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/15/business/bankers-oppose-walmart-as-rival.
html [https://perma.cc/UYP4-K8RD].
45. Igor Fasman, Wal-Mart Banking Bid, 26 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 116, 122
(2007).
46. Kenneth Spong & Eric Robbins, Industrial Loan Companies: A Growing
Industry Sparks a Public Policy Debate, FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY: ECON. REV., Fourth
Quarter 2007, at 41, 41–42.
47. Moratorium on Certain Industrial Bank Applications and Notices, 72 Fed. Reg.
5290, 5291 (Feb. 5, 2007).
48. Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 17, at 2–3.
49. Id.
50. Wal-Mart Withdraws ILC Charter Application, WALMART (Mar. 16, 2007),
https://corporate.walmart.com/_news_/news-archive/2007/03/16/wal-mart-withdrawsilc-charter-application [https://perma.cc/AQ99-K7EX].
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Crisis, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted their industrial
banks into state banks when the respective parent companies were
christened as BHCs by the Federal Reserve.51 Finally, in 2010, the DoddFrank Act brought a three-year moratorium on industrial bank charters.52
These developments, as well as the FDIC’s reluctance to accept new
applications from industrial banks, put the debates on hold.
Expiration of the moratorium and the FDIC’s decision to shorten53
the enhanced supervisory monitoring period for new depository
institutions to a three-year period54 has reignited interest in this model.
Recent applications of two financial services firms, Square and SoFi,55 for
Utah industrial bank charters and federal insurance rekindled the debate.
Some opponents called upon the FDIC to impose another moratorium on
the industrial bank applications.56 Others—driven by the concern that if
the initial applications are accepted, then it would open the floodgates for
other FinTech companies—urged Congress to abolish the exemption for
industrial banks under the BHCA.57

51. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Goldman Sachs Bank USA Holdings LLC,
94 Fed. Res. Bull. C101 (2008), 2008 WL 7861871; Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley
Capital Management LLC, Morgan Stanley Domestic Holdings, Inc., 94 Fed. Res. Bull.
C103 (2008), 2008 WL 7861872.
52. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 603, 124 Stat. 1376, 1597–98 (2010).
53. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Rescinds De Novo Time Period
Extension; Releases Supplemental Guidance on Business Planning (Apr. 6, 2016),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16027.html [https://perma.cc/ZZT3-AR
3N].
54. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DEPOSIT INSURANCE APPLICATIONS: PROCEDURES
MANUAL 36 (2017), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/applications/depositinsurance/
procmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YBG-6R77].
55. See supra note 1.
56. See Letter from Christopher Cole, Exec. Vice President & Senior Regulatory
Counsel, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., to Kathy Moe, Reg’l Dir., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
S.F. Reg’l Office 2–3 (Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.icba.org/docs/defaultsource/icba/advocacy-documents/letters-to-regulators/2017/17-10-10_fdic_ltr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9H4T-LZFC].
57. Letter from Maxine Waters, CA, Ranking Member, U.S. House of
Representatives Comm. on Fin. Servs., to Martin Gruenberg, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. 2–5 (Aug. 25, 2017), https://democrats-financialservices.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/2017.08.25_cmw_to_fdic_re_sofi_ilc_hearing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4JGY-KLHQ].
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As of this Note’s publication, there are only sixteen industrial
banks,58 and only Utah actively charters these institutions.59 Most
industrial banks are relatively small banks concentrating on specific
customer segments or financial products.60 A small minority, including
BMW Bank of North America, Inc., is owned by industrial or financial
services firms to extend commercial and consumer credit to customers of
their parent companies.61
Industrial bank charters are likely to be preferable for FinTech firms
that want to engage in the business of banking and need to retain their
other commercial activities. The BHCA limits the activities of BHCs and
their subsidiaries to banking, managing and controlling banks and other
subsidiaries, and performing services for its subsidiaries.62 Besides, some
activities that were determined by the Board before 1999 to be “so closely
related to banking as to be a proper incident thereto” are permissible for
BHCs.63 This list of permissible activities can be found in Regulation Y.64
Many operations of FinTech firms might fall into one of the permissible
activities even though these activities might not be directly related to the
financial services they provide. One prominent example is data
processing, where a marketplace lender might collect data to predict the
default risk of their customers. Providing data processing, data storage,
and data transmission services is permissible for BHCs and their
subsidiaries.65 Many marketplace lenders are able to offer consumer loans
using software tools that utilize non-traditional data for underwriting.66 If
the company decides to process data collected from a customer’s social

58. Financial Institutions, UTAH DEP’T FIN. INSTITUTIONS, https://www.utah.gov/
dfi/FinancialInstitutions.html [https://perma.cc/V7A9-9PRL] (to replicate the search
results, select “Filter by Type;” then “State Industrial Banks”) (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
59. Why the ICBA Doesn’t Want Square to be a Bank, PYMNTS (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.pymnts.com/news/alternative-financial-services/2017/icba-fightsindustrial-loan-charters-for-fintechs/ [https://perma.cc/F982-28H3].
60. Michelle Clark Neely, Industrial Loan Companies Come Out of the Shadows,
FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS: REGIONAL ECONOMIST, July 2007, at 5.
61. Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 17, at 12 tbl.1.4.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (2012).
63. Id. § 1843(c)(8).
64. 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (2017).
65. Id. § 225.28(b)(14).
66. 115th Cong. Hearing, supra note 3, at 66 (prepared statement of Frank Pasquale,
Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law).
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media accounts or their lifestyle choices, then there might be an issue.67
Regulation explicitly allows collection of data that is “financial, banking,
or economic” in nature and forbids processing or storing nonfinancial data
if the total annual revenue derived from those activities exceeds fortynine percent of the revenues derived from data processing.68 Or perhaps
the firm develops a completely novel way of providing banking services
using blockchain technology, and the categories may not encompass this
new technology. In these cases a BHC may be required to file a notice
containing the description of the activities for the Federal Reserve’s
approval and prove that the activity is “so closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto,”69 and
that it “can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public (such
as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency) that
outweigh possible adverse effects such as undue concentration of
resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest or
unsound banking practices.”70 The Board will send the notice for
publication in the Federal Register and invite public comment on the
proposal before making a determination.71 The Board may request
additional information anytime, and the approval process may take up to
120 days.72 These requirements might be dissuading for start-ups that find
them costly and time-consuming for an industry that is continuously
innovating and changing. Furthermore, when requesting approval from
the Federal Reserve, few firms would be eager to make their algorithms
or trade secrets publicly available to the entire industry (and their
competitors).
The FinTech firm might be already engaged in activities that are not
permissible under the BHCA. For example, Square owns several
subsidiaries that are engaged in operations such as online scheduling

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(14) (2017).
Id. § 225.21(a)(2).
Id. § 225.26(a).
Id. § 225.24(c).
Id. § 225.24(d)(3)–(4).

554

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXIII

services for merchants,73 food delivery,74 and data analytics for customer
engagement prediction.75 None of these services are listed under the
permissible activities list of the Regulation Y, and it is not unreasonable
to assume that the Federal Reserve would not find the food delivery
service to be incidental to the business of banking. A scheduling or data
analytics service might be permitted under the services exemption of
Regulation Y.76 This exemption allows the BHCs to perform services such
as data processing, courier services, advertising for the internal operations
of the BHC or its subsidiaries.77 At the same time, the services exemption
is limited to services provided to the BHC and its subsidiaries and does
not authorize these services to be provided to the third-parties.78 If Square
decides to enter the business of banking through non-ILC licenses, it most
likely would have to cease the non-banking activities of some of its
subsidiaries or would be required to limit these activities to its internal
operations
II. SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF
TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIAL BANK
AND THE PARENT COMPANY
A. THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE
The separation of banking and commerce is a distinctive trait of
Anglo-Saxon banking regimes.79 Contrary to the oft-repeated statements,
73. Leena Rao, Square Acquires BookFresh to Add Booking Services for Merchants,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 26, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/26/square-acquiresbookfresh-to-add-booking-services-for-merchants/ [https://perma.cc/9USF-8BRQ].
74. Press Release, Square, Inc., Caviar Introduces Pickup, Creating Even More
Ways for Diners to Order (Mar. 1, 2017), https://squareup.com/news/caviar-introducespickup-creating-even-more-ways-for-diners-to-order [https://perma.cc/8XA7-U6WQ].
75. Square Engineering, Framed Data Team Joins Square, MEDIUM (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://medium.com/square-corner-blog/framed-data-team-joins-square-6f12d1fcef27
[https://perma.cc/437N-UHMJ].
76. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(b)(2).
77. Id. § 225.22(b).
78. Id.; see John L. Douglas & Reuben Grinberg, Old Wine in New Bottles: Bank
Investments in Fintech Companies, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 667, 688 (2016).
79. For the history of the concept, see Bernard Shull, The Separation of Banking and
Commerce in the United States: An Examination of Principal Issues, 8 FIN. MKTS.,
INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, May 1999, at 1.
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the law does not explicitly prohibit affiliations between banks and
commercial business.80 Haubrich and Santos have found many examples
of close ties between commercial enterprises and the banking industry in
the United States.81 Furthermore, by enacting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (GLBA)82 in 1999, Congress effectively allowed BHCs to own
financial firms. This made some new activities that are not related to the
business of banking exempt beyond the industrial bank exemption. When
approved as a financial holding company,83 an institution has five years
to comply with the BHCA limitations of activities.84 After being classified
as financial holding companies in 2008, for a while Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs were able to own businesses categorically unrelated to
banking, such as coal mining85 and oil merchanting,86 under the merchant
banking exemption for the financial holding companies.87
Since then, banking and financial activities merged into each other,
and the remaining separation is now only between finance and
commercial activities.88 While some regulators view this merger as a

80. But see, e.g., Igor Fasman, Wal-Mart Banking Bid, 26 ANN. REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 116, 119 (2007).
81. Joseph G. Haubrich & João A. C. Santos, Alternative Forms of Mixing Banking
with Commerce: Evidence from American History, 12 FIN. MKTS., INSTITUTIONS &
INSTRUMENTS 121 (2003).
82. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
83. The financial holding company is a type of bank holding company that can
engage in financial activities and activities incidental or complementary to those financial
activities. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) (2012).
84. See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 310–11 (2013).
85. Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Goldman Sachs in Talks to Sell Its Coal Mines, WALL
STREET J. (May 3, 2015, 6:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-sachs-intalks-to-sell-its-coal-mines-1430693591 [https://perma.cc/MR4X-A7T5].
86. Press Release, Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley Completes Sale of Global Oil
Merchanting Business to Castleton Commodities International LLC (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.morganstanley.com/press-releases/21e458d2-0231-493b-a95a-5084c3b4c7
01 [https://perma.cc/X8FQ-SFKV].
87. For the scope of the merchant bank activities, see Omarova, supra note 84.
88. Christine E. Blair, Banking and Commerce: What Difference Did Wal-Mart
Make?, in FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 25, 39 (Robert R. Bliss & George G.
Kaufman eds., 2008).
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reaffirmation of the separation of the commerce and banking,89 others
have interpreted the GLBA’s authorization of the Federal Reserve to
create a list of permissible activities as part of the gradual blurring of the
difference between commercial activities and the business of banking.90
Nevertheless, under the current banking system, exceptions to the
separation of banking and commerce might entail some unique risks. The
risk of mixing banking and commerce in industrial banks was
summarized by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) as “(1)
expansion of the federal safety net provided for banks to their commercial
entities, (2) increased conflicts of interest within a mixed banking and
commercial conglomerate, and (3) increased economic power exercised
by large conglomerate enterprises.”91
One reason for the opposition to the potential FinTech banks is the
potential conflict of interest issues that may arise from their affiliation
with non-financial industries. For example, the Independent Community
Bankers of America (ICBA), claimed that “SoFi could encourage SoFi
Bank to deny credit to customers of SoFi’s competitors or alternatively,
could encourage SoFi Bank to offer loans to SoFi’s customers based on
[terms] not offered to its competitor’s customers.”92 An industry
representative claimed that “[t]he commercial company can easily be
incentivized to make the bank favor the commercial company when it
regards [its] competitors.”93
These concerns are fundamentally the same conflict of interest
arguments against granting Walmart an ILC charter.94 While some of
these issues, especially denial of credit to competitors or their customers,
89. See, e.g., Financial Services Regulatory Relief: Hearing on H.R. 1375 Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong.
10–12 (2003) (statement of Julie L. Williams, First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief
Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
90. Laurence H. Meyer, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Dirs., Remarks Before the
American Law Institute and American Bar Association: Implementing the GrammLeach-Bliley Act: One Year Later (Feb. 15, 2001), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/2001/20010215/default.htm [https://perma.cc/BH3C-NXCU].
91. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 40, at 71.
92. Letter from Christopher Cole, Exec. Vice President & Senior Regulatory
Counsel, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., to Kathy Moe, Reg’l Dir., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
S.F. Reg’l Office 4 (July 18, 2017), http://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/defaultdocument-library/cl071817.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW8E-8EJQ].
93. See generally Why the ICBA Doesn’t Want Square to be a Bank, supra note 59.
94. See supra Part I.
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may have some merit in the context of a commercial behemoth such as
Walmart, neither the size nor the structure of FinTech firms are capable
of creating any disturbance in the competitiveness of the market.
Furthermore, FinTech firms are mostly engaged in services similar or
complementary to the banking and finance industries. A potential
FinTech bank denying service to the customers of other FinTech firms
would be very similar to a situation in which a bank denies servicing
customers of another bank. This is not a matter specific to the mixing of
banking and commerce and might better be addressed by antitrust laws.
With respect to the advantages given to the parent company or the
customers of the parent company, Sections 23A and 23B of the FRA
prohibit the industrial banks from entering into certain transactions unless
they conduct these transactions at arm’s-length.95
On the other hand, some industry observers see benefits to mixing
banking and commerce. These benefits are “economies of scale, . . .
economies of scope, and enhanced product and geographic
diversification.”96 In particular, innovations in financial technologies
have a strong tendency to create economies of scope through a
combination of financial services with e-commerce, data analytics, and
the sharing economy.97 Furthermore, lowering the costs for FinTech will
have positive effects on access to credit. FinTech firms, in their unique
situation, provide loans to consumers and small businesses who would
typically have difficulty accessing credit. Also, the possibility of a onestop shop for the customers would reduce transaction costs.98 For
example, Square provides point-of-sale hardware to small enterprises.99
95. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (2012). For an analysis of the firewall provisions, see
infra Part II.B.
96. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 40, at 73.
97. Hiroshi Nakaso, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan, Remarks at the
University of Tokyo - Bank of Japan Joint Conference in Tokyo on “FinTech and the
Future of Money”: FinTech–Its Impacts on Finance, Economies and Central Banking 3
(Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/koen_2016/data/
ko161118a.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TYW-ZZEH]; Christine E. Blair, The Future of
Banking in America: The Mixing of Banking and Commerce: Current Policy Issues, 16
FDIC BANKING REV. 97, 101 (2004).
98. Alexander Raskovich, Should Banking be Kept Separate from Commerce 12
(Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper No. 08-9, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2008/09/05/236665.pdf [https://perma.cc/WYU2-5ZH9].
99. Square Point of Sale, SQUARE, INC., https://squareup.com/pos [https://perma.cc/
VA3Y-FDKZ] (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
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The possibility of accessing Square’s banking applications through the
same platform would be convenient for the customers.
Still, significant concern remains regarding the access of commercial
owners of industrial banks to the federal safety net. Industrial banks are
covered by the federal safety net because they are insured by the FDIC
and have access to the Federal Reserve’s payments systems and discount
window. The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 made
all industrial banks eligible for FDIC insurance.100 Utah, as the only
jurisdiction that charters ILCs, requires industrial banks to be FDICinsured.101 Any non-member bank can access the Board’s payments
facilities by virtue of holding balances at the Federal Reserve Banks.102
The federal safety net—consisting of the deposit insurance, Fedwire, and
discount window facilities— is claimed to be a subsidy given to the
banking system because of banks’ privileged function to provide liquidity
in order to “protect depositors, stem bank runs, and lower the level of risk
to the financial system from the insolvency of individual institutions.”103
Extension of the safety net would “make insured banks susceptible to the
reputational, operational, and financial risks of their commercial
affiliates.”104 If the federal safety net is subsidized, then parts of the
federal safety net must be underpriced for the industrial banks.105 Beyond
that, if there are subsidies, there might be loopholes where the parent
company finds an incentive to threaten the bank’s solvency.106
100. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 703, 96 Stat. 1469, 1538–39 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1813, 1815 (2012)).
101. Utah Code Ann. § 7-8-3(4)(b) (West 2017) (“An industrial bank may not conduct
business under this chapter as an industrial bank unless the industrial bank obtains
insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or a successor federal deposit
insurance entity for any deposits received or held by the industrial bank.”).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 342 (2012).
103. Modernization of the Financial System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. (1997),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1997/19970213.htm [https://per
ma.cc/XAU7-U8G6] (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System).
104. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., supra note 41, at 33
(2016).
105. Randy Benjenk, Quixotic Regulation: Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act
and Containment of the Federal Safety Net Subsidy, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 461, 469
(2012).
106. See infra Part II.B.
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B. ELEMENTS OF THE FEDERAL SAFETY NET
1. Federal Insurance
There are two types of protections under the federal safety net:
explicit and implicit.107 Explicit protection of the deposit insurance gives
guarantees to households in case of bank failure.108 Implicit protections
subsidize the risks by decreasing the risk premiums charged on the
transactions of the protected institutions by the markets.109 This view
presupposes that the market is inherently an equilibrium sustaining
system whereas rational decision making agents price risk accordingly so
long as there is perfect information and no external perturbation. The
existence of the deposit insurance affects the information channel by
making it harder for the creditors of the bank to price risk.110 The credit
terms of a high-risk bank would be similar to a lower-risk bank while the
high-risk bank enjoys the benefits of the low-priced insurance premium.
In fact, from its inception until 1991, the FDIC was required to
charge a fixed premium rate for all depository institutions, resulting in
subsidization of the high-risk banks.111 Section 302 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991112 changed this by
requiring the FDIC to implement a risk-based assessment system that
requires the depository institutions to pay insurance premiums according
to the perceived risk these institutions constitute to the Depository
Insurance Fund.113 Since then, various researchers have found no
evidence that deposit insurance is significantly underpriced.114

107. FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, PERSPECTIVES ON TOO BIG TO FAIL 1–2
(2017), https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/research/our_perspective
s/pdf/perspectives_too_big_to_fail.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5ZU-7JBS].
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id.
111. Diane Ellis, Deposit Insurance Funding: Assuring Confidence 6 (Nov. 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/assuringconfidence.
pdf [https://perma.cc/G2WM-GPHD].
112. Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 302, 105 Stat. 2236, 2345–49 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2012)).
113. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2012).
114. Raskovich, supra note 98, at 6–7 (summarizing findings by application of the
Black-Scholes formula to deposit insurance).
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If the deposit insurance is priced fairly, it will not give any benefits
to the insured bank.115 Some commentators claim that it is impossible to
fairly price the deposit insurance because the FDIC cannot always refuse
coverage to riskier depository institutions and new banks carry risks that
cannot be fully assessed.116 In any event, some claim that in a perfect
market, any benefits accrued from the mispriced deposit insurance would
trickle down to the customers because of competition.117
Until now, financial start-ups have been avoiding establishing FDICinsured banks. Between 2011 and 2016, there were only ten de novo bank
applications.118 That might be because the stringent requirements of the
FDIC dissuaded start-ups from applying for bank charters,119 or it might
be that these start-ups could easily operate under state money transmitter
or lender licenses without any federal insurance requirements.
Offering FDIC insurance to industrial banks may endorse risk-taking
behavior with customer deposits and destabilize the financial system.
However, the current regime for the money transmitters has its own risks.
The example of PayPal Holdings, Inc. (PayPal) is illustrative. PayPal, one
of the earliest FinTech firms originated from Silicon Valley, is not a state
or national bank and operates under state money transmitter licenses.120
While it does not take “deposits,” customers can hold balances in their
PayPal accounts.121 These balances do not have federal insurance, and
they merely “represent[] an unsecured claim against PayPal.”122 These
115. Joe Peek & James A. Wilcox, The Fall and Rise of Banking Safety Net Subsidies,
in TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 169, 175
(Benton E. Gup ed., 2004) (“A fair deposit insurance premium charged by a risk neutral
government would equal the sum of expected deposit losses plus any administrative
costs.”).
116. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 223–24
(6th ed. 2017).
117. Raskovich, supra note 98, at 7.
118. Oversight of the FDIC Application Process: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 12 (2016) [hereinafter 114th Cong. Hearing]
(statement of Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
119. Id. at 29–30 (statement of Matthew Browning).
120. See PayPal State Licenses, supra note 24.
121. PayPal User Agreement, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/
ua/useragreement-full?bn_r=o#5 [https://perma.cc/S3BD-JJXE] (last visited Mar. 1,
2018) (“Money that you receive from other PayPal account holders is held as a balance
in your PayPal account.”).
122. Id.

2018]

HOW BANKING INNOVATIONS AFFECT THE
FEDERAL SAFETY NET

561

balances of the customers reached $15 billion in 2016.123 In order to
comply with the Californian Money Transmitter Laws, PayPal abandoned
its previous practice of keeping the customer accounts in FDIC insured
pass-through deposit accounts and had been investing these funds in
liquid investments for its own benefit.124
Given PayPal’s preeminence in the money transmission domain, in
case of insolvency, it is not difficult to imagine the contagion that might
affect the whole financial system. In fact, the only way to protect
customers from a potential failure of PayPal would be federal deposit
insurance, which is accessible only to the depository institutions. Even
though FDIC insurance might reinforce the risk-taking behavior of the
depository institutions, the FDIC’s authority to reject the application of
an institution that poses a significant risk to the deposit insurance stays as
a safeguard against moral hazard.125 In the circumstances similar to
PayPal, it should be assessed whether the benefits of insuring such
companies outweigh the possible adverse effects to the safety net.
2. Fedwire Services and Fed Funds
Industrial banks can access the Federal Reserve’s payment services
such as check clearing, electronic fund transfers, automated clearinghouse
payments, and currency services.126 As recipients of NOW deposits,127
industrial banks are required to hold a certain amount of funds in Federal
Fund Reserves.128 Balances may “be checked against and withdrawn by
123. The amount is stated under funds payable and amounts due to customers on the
balance sheet. PayPal Holdings, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 60 (Feb. 8, 2017).
124. David Bergendahl, Your PayPal Balance Isn’t FDIC Insured: The Case for a
New
Model
for
Financial
Startups,
MEDIUM
(Sept.
21,
2014),
https://medium.com/@dbrgndl/paypal-isnt-fdic-insured-non-banks-being-bankish-anda-new-model-for-financial-startups-df6d16c2d4b
[https://perma.cc/8F6Z-WQQE];
Izabella Kaminska, Is It a Bank, a Money Transmitter, or a Silicon Valley Shadow
Financier? No, It’s Just Paypal!, FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (Aug. 6, 2015),
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/08/06/2136828/is-it-a-bank-a-money-transmitter-or-asilicon-valley-shadow-financier-no-its-just-paypal/
[https://perma.cc/M79D-98FK];
PayPal User Agreement, supra note 121.
125. Zachariah J. Lloyd, Waging War with Wal-Mart: A Cry for Change Threatens
the Future of Industrial Loan Corporations, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 211 (2008).
126. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., supra note 41, at 32.
127. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
128. 12 C.F.R. § 204.4(f) (2017).
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[the depository institution] for the purpose of meeting existing
liabilities.”129 Due to trust in the reserves and the payments system, banks
use Fedwire services to make unsecured overnight loans to other
depository institutions that need funding.130 The Board’s guarantee for the
Fedwire transactions lowers transaction costs for the participants in the
Federal Funds market and might behave as a subsidy to the payments
system users.131
Additionally, there is the issue regarding the interest paid on
reserves. The FRA was amended to allow the Federal Reserve to pay
interest on balances held at Federal Reserves at a rate not “exceed[ing]
the general level of short-term interest rates.”132 This is implemented as a
part of the floor-based monetary policy operations because of the inability
to lower the near-zero Federal Funds target rate.133 Using this authority,
the Federal Reserve has paid interest on excess and required banks to hold
reserve balances since 2008.134 As a part of the monetary policy, interest
on excess reserves is paid to discourage depository institutions from
lending overnight at rates lower than the excess reserve rate.135
However, participating in the Federal Funds market or earning
interest on reserves is not always significantly profitable. In fact, some
believe the reason behind the lack of de novo bank applications after the

129.
130.

12 U.S.C. § 464 (2012).
For the history and the mechanics of the Fed Funds market, see Seth P.
Maerowitz, The Market for Federal Funds, FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND: ECON. REV.,
July–Aug. 1981, at 3. See generally Gara Alfonso & Ricardo Lagos, An Empirical Study
of Trade Dynamics in the Fed Funds Market 4-6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Research Dep’t, Working Paper No. 708, 2014), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
research/wp/WP708.pdf [https://perma.cc/K659-G579].
131. See Rob Tammero, Private Equity Investment in Failed Banks: Controlling Risks
to the Federal Safety Net, 11 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 53, 63–64 (2010).
132. Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 201,
120 Stat. 1966, 1968–69 (2006) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (2012)).
133. See generally Marc Lavoie, Changes in Central Bank Procedures during the
Subprime Crisis and Their Repercussions on Monetary Theory, 39 INT’L J. POL. ECON.,
Fall 2010, at 3, 10–11.
134. Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 73 Fed. Reg. 59,482 (Oct. 9,
2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 204 (2017)).
135. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Board Announces That It
Will Begin to Pay Interest on Depository Institutions’ Required and Excess Reserve
Balances (Oct. 6, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
monetary20081006a.htm [https://perma.cc/UH6U-H69L].
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2008 Financial Crisis is the near-zero Federal Funds rate.136 According to
this view, profit margins of new banks without established lending
portfolios are too reliant on the rate.137 Indeed, it is found that new entrants
to the banking system tend to hold more money in Federal Fund Reserves
as compared to established banks.138 Due to their lack of established
portfolio to lend against, these banks are stuck with the low-interest
rates.139 Therefore, some investors might be dissuaded from participating
in banking activities and instead invest in more profitable ventures.
Accordingly, access to the payments system or the Federal Funds market
may have a subsidy effect, but the effect might not be the same for the
FinTech firms that aspire to enter the banking sector and the established
players.
3. Discount Window Lending and Intraday Credit
The discount window facility is part of the Federal Reserve’s “lender
of last resort” function.140 Through the discount window, depository
institutions in need of liquidity can access Federal Reserve loans secured
by adequate141 collateral.142 The Federal Reserve effectively conducts
asset swaps that alter the mix of assets available for use by private market

136. 114th Cong. Hearing, supra note 118, at 3 (statement of Elijah E. Cummings,
Ranking Minority Member).
137. Id.
138. Robert M. Adams & Jacob P. Gramlich, Where Are All the New Banks? The Role
of Regulatory Burden in New Charter Creation 9 (Divs. of Research & Statistics &
Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series No. 2014-113, 2014),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/2014113pap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CVK-7PPP].
139. Id. at 11, 12.
140. For the lender of last resort function of the Federal Reserve, see MARC LABONTE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21986, FEDERAL RESERVE: LENDER OF LAST RESORT
FUNCTIONS (2007).
141. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE
COLLATERAL GUIDELINES 4 (2017), https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/~/media/
Documents/FRcollguidelines.ashx [https://perma.cc/L3XG-WPWD] (“In general,
securities must meet the regulatory definition of ‘investment grade’ at a minimum, and
in some cases must be of ‘AAA’ rating quality (where indicated).”).
142. See Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BOARD GOVERNORS
FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_lendingdepository.
htm [https://perma.cc/U4ME-4YGP] (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
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participants.143 The discount window facility usually lends at fifty basis
points higher than the Federal Funds rate,144 making it more expensive for
the depository institutions to obtain.
A daylight overdraft (or Federal Reserve’s intraday credit) has
similar mechanics, but no collateral is needed.145 Any time during the
Fedwire operating day, if an institution’s Federal Reserve account has a
negative balance, the depository institution incurs daylight overdraft.146
The Federal Reserve charges institutions with 50 to 150 basis point
penalty fees if the overdraft is not collateralized.147 If collateralized, there
is no penalty fee.148
The discount window resembles a subsidy because it is in place to
address liquidity requirements in times of distress for financial
institutions when they are unable to borrow from the market without an
increased risk premium. Therefore, for reputational reasons, depository
institutions choose to access the lending facilities as a last resort. Further,
healthy financial institutions can borrow cheaply in the Federal Funds
market if they are not in a dire situation. A discount window is
underpriced in times of financial uncertainty because institutions that
borrow from the facilities would have very limited access to loans from
market participants.149 This might cause “moral hazard” in protected
institutions as they may not take precautions to limit risks, such as

143. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON THE GLOB. FIN. SYS., CENTRAL BANK
OPERATING FRAMEWORKS AND COLLATERAL MARKETS 13–14 (2015),
https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs53.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y79M-34DM].
144. See, e.g., Current Discount Rates, FED. RES. DISCOUNT WINDOW,
https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/en/Pages/Discount-Rates/Current-Discount-Rates.
aspx [https://perma.cc/796D-QTZ8] (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) (quoting primary rate
effective from December 14, 2017 as 2.00% while the Fed Funds Target rate is 1.25–
1.50%).
145. Frequently Asked Questions: Payment System Risk, FED. RES. DISCOUNT
WINDOW: PAYMENT SYS. RISK, https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/Pages/PaymentSystem-Risk/Frequently_Asked_Questions.aspx [https://perma.cc/6N7G-C9AF] (last
updated July 10, 2015).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Benjenk, supra note 105, at 472.
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adequate capital or contractual safeguards, knowing that they will have
access to liquidity through the discount window.150
Beyond the protections provided by the FRA against transferring
these benefits to the parent company,151 the BHCA sanctions the
extension of intraday credit to the commercial affiliates of industrial
banks. Any industrial bank that incurs overdraft on behalf of an affiliate
will lose its exempt status, and the parent company will automatically
become a BHC.152 As a result, the parent company would likely be
required to cease its commercial operations.153
C. FIREWALL PREVENTING THE EXTENSION OF THE SAFETY NET
Sections 23A and 23B of the FRA154 function as a firewall to prevent
the depository institutions from extending subsidies provided by the
federal safety net to their affiliates. These provisions cover the
transactions between a bank and its parent company or subsidiary (both
defined as “affiliates”).155 Under Section 23A of the FRA, the aggregate
amount of transactions a depository institution can engage in with the
parent company or a subsidiary is limited to ten percent of the capital
stock and surplus of the bank.156 The total transactions with all affiliates
and the bank cannot be higher than twenty percent of the capital stock and
surplus.157 In addition to these restrictions, there are certain qualitative
limits on the transactions. Certain transactions involving the extension of
credit to the affiliates need to be collateralized.158 Even though this
collateralization requirement does not apply to the purchase of assets, an
additional restriction on the purchase of low-quality assets from the

150. Cf. FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, supra note 107, at 2 (“The expectation
of government support weakens the private sector’s ability and willingness to limit risk,
resulting in excessive risk-taking. As a result, an extensive safety net creates a need for
robust supervision of firms benefitting from perceived protection.”).
151. See infra Part II.C.
152. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H) (2012).
153. See supra Part I.B.
154. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1.
155. Id. §§ 371c(b)(1),1828(j)(1)(A).
156. Id. § 371c(a)(1)(A).
157. Id. § 371c(a)(1)(B).
158. Id. § 371c(c)(1).
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affiliates contains the potential harm from the sale of bad loans or
investments to the banks.159
Section 23B of the FRA requires most transactions between the bank
and the affiliate to be at arm’s-length.160 A depository institution may
engage in those transactions with the parent companies or subsidiaries
only on the terms and conditions that are substantially the same as
comparable transactions with nonaffiliated institutions.161 If no such
transaction exists, the transaction must be on the same terms offered to
nonaffiliated firms.162
Sections 23A and 23B limit some transactions with third-parties.
Section 23B also covers transactions with third-parties in which an
affiliate has a vested financial interest.163 Sections 23A and 23B treat
transactions with unaffiliated third-parties as transactions engaged with
affiliates “to the extent that the proceeds of the transaction are used for
the benefit of, or transferred to, an affiliate.”164 Furthermore, Regulation
W tightens the limitations on transactions with third-parties. For example,
the depository institution cannot purchase a low-quality asset from an
affiliate if the bank did not commit to purchasing the asset “before . . . the
asset was acquired by the affiliate,”165 or it cannot issue credit cards to
customers to purchase products and services from affiliates if the value of
products and services purchased with the card is more than twenty-five
percent of total purchases.166
There are some scenarios concerning possible leakage of the federal
safety net to the commercial parents. For example, the subsidy effect can
spread to the commercial subsidiary if the industrial bank uses the
intraday credit or the discount window services to bail out its insolvent or
illiquid parent company.167 This would threaten the safety and soundness
of the bank while the parent company keeps its losses limited to its

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

issues).

Id. § 371c(a)(3), (b)(10).
Id. § 371c-1.
Id. § 371c-1(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 371c-1(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 371c-1(a)(2)(E).
12 C.F.R. § 223.16(a) (2017).
Id. § 223.15.
Id. § 223.16(c)(4).
Cf. Spong & Robbins, supra note 46, at 59–60 (citing these as conflict of interest
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investment in the bank.168 Second, in order to deceive the public about its
financial situation and gains from the commercial operations, the parent
company could shift losses to the subsidiary bank using any combination
of transactions such as sales or lending.169 The bank and the parent
company could avoid the market discipline because the mispriced
insurance might misguide the creditors when they assess the riskiness of
the depository institution or the parent company. 170 This way, the parent
company could gain an unfair advantage over its commercial competitors.
However, in these cases, the firewall provisions might provide
adequate protection for the bank with quantitative and qualitative
limitations on the extension of credit. Extending the credit to an affiliate,
issuing letters of credit for the benefit of the affiliate, purchasing assets or
securities, lending or borrowing securities to an affiliate, accepting
securities issued by an affiliate to extend loans, and engaging in
derivatives trade with the affiliate are all covered by the quantitative
provisions.171 First of all, the aggregate amount of these transactions
between the bank and its affiliates cannot exceed twenty percent of the
bank’s capital,172 thereby limiting the damage the bank—and the federal
safety net—might endure if any other limitations on transactions fail.
These covered transactions, together with activities involving the bank’s
sale of securities to an affiliate, fees the affiliate receives for its activities
as the agent or broker of the bank, and transactions between the bank and
third-party in which the affiliate has financial interest have to be
conducted on terms that are substantially the same as comparable
transactions with nonaffiliates.173 A parent company seeking to enter into
dealings that are detrimental to the bank would have significant
difficulties because almost all possible transactions with the bank would
have to be conducted on market terms. Additionally, in conjunction with
the arm’s-length provision, the requirement for credit transactions with
the affiliates to be secured by sound collateral174 would discourage a
parent company from increasing the credit exposure of the bank.
168. Christine E. Blair, The Future of Banking in America: The Mixing of Banking
and Commerce: Current Policy Issues, 16 FDIC BANKING REV. 97, 106–07 (2004).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7) (2012).
172. Id. § 371c(a).
173. Id. § 371c-1(a).
174. Id. § 371c(c).
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D. CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION
The magnitude of the risk may also depend on the regulatory
safeguards present. Industrial banks, as FDIC-insured state non-member
institutions, have the FDIC as their primary federal supervisor instead of
the Board.175 The Federal Reserve cited a lack of consolidated supervision
of the parent companies of industrial banks as a source of risk in the
extension of the safety net.176 The Board’s consolidated supervision for
the BHCs includes an examination of:
[T]he nature of the operations and financial condition of the bank
holding company . . . the financial, operational, and other risks within
the bank holding company system that may pose a threat to . . . the
safety and soundness of the bank holding company or [its subsidiaries]
. . . or the stability of the financial system.177

The scope of this examination is claimed to be more extensive than
the approaches taken by the FDIC and state regulators, which concentrate
only on the depository institution.178
The FDIC’s view is that the authority it possesses over the industrial
banks is sufficient to protect the industrial bank from the parent
company.179 Even though the FDIC does not have the explicit authority to
supervise a parent company or force an injection of capital into a
subsidiary if needed, the FDIC is authorized to examine the affairs of any
affiliate of an industrial bank and the relationship between the bank and
its affiliates.180 The FDIC has the direct authority to initiate enforcement
action against any affiliate of a bank that is determined to be an
“institution-affiliated party.”181 Institution-affiliated parties include
controlling stockholders, agents, and joint venture partners of a bank.182
The FDIC examines the incorporation structure and the detailed

175. This authority stems from the application requirements of these institutions for
the federal insurance. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a).
176. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., supra note 41, at 33–34.
177. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(A).
178. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., supra note 41, at 33–34.
179. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 40, at 47.
180. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(4)(A).
181. Id. § 1813(u).
182. Id.
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transactions between the parent company and the ILC.183 Moreover, the
examiners compare the terms of the affiliate transactions with the terms
of third-party transactions.184 In 2005, with some reservations, GAO
found FDIC’s supervision adequate for mitigating risk in good times.185
Furthermore, consolidated supervision might not guarantee bank
stability. Despite the warnings of financial instability created by industrial
banks, the lack of consolidated supervision did not cause a significant
problem regarding the safety and soundness of industrial banks.186 During
the 2008 Financial Crisis, only two industrial banks failed.187 The impact
of the crisis weighed heavily on parent companies or affiliates of the
industrial banks, such as Lehman Brothers and General Motors who filed
for bankruptcy, yet the industrial banks themselves did not fail.188
Commercial firms are generally involved in unique and more
complex transactions than supervisors are used to. In some circumstances,
consolidated supervision might be burdensome and difficult for the
supervisor to implement.189 Federal Reserve officials acknowledged that
consolidated supervision was insufficient to prevent the failures of some
BHCs during the Financial Crisis.190

183.
184.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 40, at 48–49.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-160, BANK HOLDING COMPANY
ACT: CHARACTERISTICS AND REGULATION OF EXEMPT INSTITUTIONS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF REMOVING THE EXEMPTIONS 26 (2012).
185. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 40, at 64–65.
186. Cf. Mindy West, The FDIC’s Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: A
Historical Perspective, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum04/industrial_loans.html (last updated June 25,
2004) [https://perma.cc/W9PU-W8UC] (explaining that most failed ILCs between 1985
and 2003 were newly entrants with an above-average risk profile).
187. 114th Cong. Hearing, supra note 118, at 23 (statement of Martin J. Gruenberg,
Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
188. Id.
189. Spong & Robbins, supra note 46, at 59.
190. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 40, at 43.
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III. ALTERNATIVE MODELS BEYOND
INDUSTRIAL BANKS
A. NONMEMBER BANK SUBSIDIARIES
The FinTech firms seeking industrial bank charters might not want
to cease their non-bank activities that are potentially impermissible under
the BHCA.191 For these firms, conversion of a FinTech firm to a state bank
instead of directly controlling a bank might be another alternative solution
to integrate their non-banking FinTech operations with the banking
activities. Banks that are not controlled by another entity, as well as
financial and operational subsidiaries of the banks are exempt from the
BHCA provisions.192 If these exempt nonmember banks are national
banks, the OCC would be their primary supervisor.193 If they are statechartered banks, the primary federal supervisor would be the FDIC.194
The FDIC supervision does not mean that the state nonmember
banks have unlimited powers. Section 24 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act prevents state banks from engaging as principals in any activity that
is not permissible for a national bank unless the FDIC “has determined
that the activity would pose no significant risk to the Deposit Insurance
Fund; and . . . the State bank is, and continues to be, in compliance with
applicable capital standards prescribed by the appropriate Federal
banking agency.”195 Parallel to this provision, subsidiaries of the state
banks are restricted from engaging as principals in any activity that is
neither permitted for a subsidiary of a national bank nor determined by
the FDIC as posing no significant risk to the insurance fund.196
This framework entails some interesting possibilities for the nonbank
activities. To determine whether an activity is permissible for national
banks, the FDIC will defer to the OCC’s interpretation of the national

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See supra Part I.C.
12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2012).
See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 116, at 96–97 (6th ed. 2017).
See id.
Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 303(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2349 (1991) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1831a(a)).
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(d)(1).
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banking powers.197 The OCC determined that “finder activities”—i.e.,
nearly all operations that involve bringing parties together to exchange
goods or services—are part of the business of banking.198 These activities
include, but are not limited to, hosting commercial websites for small
retailers,199 providing links to websites for internet vendors,200 marketing
devices that enable customers to communicate with financial service
providers.201 The OCC’s interpretation of permissible activities is
potentially broader than the Board’s permissible activities list for
BHCs.202 Given the structure of the Board’s regulatory framework, it is
not clear that that the Board would find some of these “finder activities”
permissible under the Regulation Y scheme.203
Probably the most interesting consequence of these provisions is
regarding the subsidiary activities authorized by the state laws that are not
permissible for the national banks. The FDIC could still permit these
activities as long as the activity is not determined to pose a significant risk
to the insurance fund.204 A quick glance at the list of investments approved
by the FDIC shows that bank subsidiaries were allowed to engage as
principals in a wide variety of activities not permissible for national

197. Decisions on Bank Applications: Investments & Activities, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP. (July 25, 2012), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/
InvestActivity [https://perma.cc/9H5S-GJS8].
198. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1002 (2017).
199. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Interpretive Letter No. 856, [1998–
1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,313 (Mar. 5, 1999),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/licensing/interpretations-and-actions/1999/int856.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H2RE-ZD9H].
200. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Conditional Approval No. 221 (Dec.
4, 1996), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/bank-operations/bit/opinions-letters/ca221.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBZ3-BZML]; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Interpretive Letter No. 611, [1992–1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 83,449 (Nov. 23, 1992).
201. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 875, [1999–
2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,369 (Oct. 31, 1999),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/licensing/interpretations-and-actions/2000/int875.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XUV-BSEV].
202. See supra Part I.B.
203. John L. Douglas & Reuben Grinberg, Old Wine in New Bottles: Bank
Investments in Fintech Companies, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 667, 684 (2016).
204. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(a) (2012).
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banks, including manufacturing cable installation tools,205 renting cars,206
building mausoleums, and selling crypts and niches.207 Even though this
permission has not been requested for technology investments in the
recent times,208 the FDIC has been historically supportive of the state bank
endeavors in innovative fields.209 For example, in the past, the FDIC
allowed some subsidiaries of state banks to offer services in due diligence
document retrieval,210 personality traits analysis,211 and data processing.212
Some of these operations are similar to the activities permissible under
the services exemption of the Federal Reserve.213 The core difference of
the FDIC exemptions from the services exemption is that there is no
limitation on offering these services to third-parties.
This approach might be taken by FinTech firms to retain their nonbank services offered to third-parties, yet it may create some safety net
issues that are not present in an industrial bank. Transactions between a
bank and its nonbank subsidiary are exempt from the firewall provisions
of the FRA.214 Congress reasonably required the FDIC permit for nonbank
activities to prevent exposure of the federal insurance to the risks these
205. Bank of Kaukauna (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. July 27, 2000), https://www.fdic.gov
/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/investactivity/kaukauna.html [https://perma.cc/HSS8UKJZ].
206. FirstBank of P.R. (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. June 4, 1996), https://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/bankdecisions/investactivity/firstbankofpr.html
[https://perma.cc/9UMF-D5NW].
207. Cmty. State Bank (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. June 27, 2005), https://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/bankdecisions/investactivity/communitystatebankaustin.html [https://
perma.cc/P6ER-8736].
208. Douglas & Grinberg, supra note 203, at 706.
209. Arthur E. Wilmarth, JR., Federal Preemption: The OCC’s Preemption Rules
Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present A Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System
and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 261 n.142 (2004).
210. CityBank Lynnwood (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Dec. 10, 2001), https://www.fdic.
gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/investactivity/citybank.html
[https://perma.cc/5GAT-6AGP].
211. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 1994), https://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/bankdecisions/investactivity/branchbanking.html [https://perma.cc/Z4
TC-UT76].
212. Columbus Bank & Tr. Co. (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 1994),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/investactivity/columbusbanktrust.
html [https://perma.cc/3NYQ-JTKT].
213. See supra Part I.B.
214. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(2) (2012).
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activities might entail, but the lack of a firewall might still exacerbate the
moral hazard problems stemming from the leakage of the safety net to
non-bank entities. A non-bank activity might not create undue risk per se,
however, it might involve operations that transfer the risk of the
commercial entity to the depository institution. The FDIC addressed this
issue in some of its approvals of nonbank activities by making Sections
23A and 23B of the FRA applicable for the transactions between these
subsidiaries and the state banks.215 Provided that the FDIC retains this
decision in the future, conducting these activities under subsidiaries will
not pose a risk to the federal insurance any more than the industrial banks.
Furthermore, retaining the commercial entity as a subsidiary resolves
some of the moral hazard issues industrial banks could be susceptible to.
First, the commercial entity cannot shift losses to the bank for the
purposes of limiting its liability because it would no longer hold shares of
the bank. Second, the firewall provisions might be ineffective against
transfers of the safety net benefits as dividend payments made to the
parent company because dividend payments are not covered under
Sections 23A and 23B of the FRA.216 The reversed ownership structure
of the bank and the commercial entity would prevent these transfers to the
commercial entity that could normally take place in an industrial bank
ownership hierarchy.
B. CREDIT CARD BANKS
A compelling reason for the FinTech firms to own a bank could
simply be that they want to issue credit cards. This way they might
streamline the payments of the loans, the credit cards, and offer credit
cards to their existing customer base. Prominent credit card networks,
such as Visa and Mastercard, require their members to have federal
deposit insurance.217 Many non-bank institutions—including FinTech
215. See, e.g., FirstBank of P.R. (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. June 4, 1996),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/investactivity/firstbankofpr.html
[https://perma.cc/9UMF-D5NW]; CityBank Lynnwood (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Dec. 10,
2001),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/investactivity/citybank.
html [https://perma.cc/5GAT-6AGP].
216. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c(b)(7), 371c-1(a)(2).
217. Andrew Kahr, Why Allow Only Banks to Issue Credit Cards?, AM. BANKER
(Aug. 22, 2012, 11:26 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/why-allow-onlybanks-to-issue-credit-cards [https://perma.cc/6XP2-CSAF].
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firms—have already entered into “Rent-a-Bank Identification Number”
agreements with insured banks to issue credit cards.218 These
arrangements can be costly and increase the price of credit to consumers.
Thus, simply decreasing the costs of the credit cards might be a strong
reason for some of the firms to have an interest in ILCs.
Credit card banks might be a good alternative to the industrial banks
if the FinTech firm is solely interested in credit card banking and not
interested in deposit-taking activities. On account of sharing the same
exemption from the BHCA definition of banks with ILCs, credit card
banks can be owned by commercial entities.219 Similar to the industrial
banks, these credit card banks cannot accept demand deposits.220 While
the industrial banks can freely accept time deposits and extend loans,
credit card banks can only accept savings or time deposits of more than
$100,000, can manage only one office to accept these deposits and cannot
engage in commercial loans besides credit card loans extended to small
businesses.221
Even though commercial firms can own the credit card banks, this
exemption from the BHCA did not give rise to a controversy similar to
the one surrounding the industrial banks. This is possibly because credit
card bank activities are designed to be highly restricted to credit card
operations.222 In addition to the restrictions of the firewall provisions of
the FRA, the Board restricts some transactions where the credit card
issued by the bank is used to purchase goods or services from the
commercial entity.223 These additional limitations have made these
institutions’ impact on the federal safety net minimal.

218. See Credit Card Issuing Rent-a-Bins, in FED. RES. DEPOSIT CORP., RISK
MANAGEMENT EXAMINATION MANUAL FOR CREDIT CARD ACTIVITIES 120,
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/credit_card/pdf_version/ch14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DYR4-R8JD].
219. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting
the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 113, 170 (2012).
223. 12 C.F.R. § 223.16(c)(4) (2017); see supra Part I.B.
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CONCLUSION
The recent interest of FinTech firms in bank charters seems to
originate from practical considerations and issues with their business
models, rather than an intention to expand the federal subsidies to the
commercial business. While these firms, if granted charters, will
undoubtedly have access to some benefits of the federal safety net, there
will usually be adequate protection to prevent these ILCs from benefitting
their parent companies or subsidiaries. Meanwhile, accessing the federal
safety net may decrease the costs of loans to the public, increase access
to credit, and reduce the systemic risk. It should be assessed whether the
benefits of the ILC charter to the public—such as greater convenience,
increased competition, or gains in efficiency—outweigh the possible
adverse effects.
These FinTech firms might have an interest in the industrial bank
charters because they might require retaining their non-bank operations
to preserve their competitiveness. Nevertheless, an industrial bank is not
the only way for a FinTech firm to participate in the business of banking.
Depending on their requirements, and the type of operations they may
wish to pursue, these firms may engage in a broad range of non-bank
activities through state non-member bank subsidiaries or credit card
banks. Similar to industrial banks, these options do not constitute a
significant threat to the safety net. Additionally, conducting non-bank
operations through subsidiaries could even eliminate some moral hazard
problems that might be observed in industrial banks. In order to encourage
the innovative financial technologies, states might develop bank charters
encompassing a broader list of permissible activities for non-bank
subsidiaries.

